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Divorce and Separation-Child Support-Enforcement
and Modification of Obligation Upon Death of Father*
In enforcing a claim for child support against the estate of the
father, American jurisdictions adhere to three views. Under the
common law, the rule is that a claim for future child support pay-
ments is invalid after the father's death.' A second group of courts
allows the claim to survive if the court indicated at the time the
decree was entered that the support obligation was intended to sur-
vive the death of the father.2 A third group of courts holds that the
obligation is always enforceable.3 The distinctions between a claim
involving child support and one for alimony and detailed studies of
the tripartite division of the jurisdictions on the child support issue
have been made by numerous authors.4
The question whether a child support obligation continues after
the death of the father was recently decided by the New Mexico
Supreme Court in a case of first impression. 5 In Hill v. Matthews,'
* Hill v. Matthews, 416 P.2d 144 (N.M. 1966).
1. E.g., Robinson v. Robinson, 131 W. Va. 160, 50 S.E.2d 455 (1948) ; Sandlin's
Adm'x v. Allen, 262 Ky. 355, 90 S.W.2d 350 (1936) ; Blades v. Szatai, 151 Md. 644,
135 At. 841 (1927).
2. E.g., Garber v. Robitshek, 226 Minn. 398, 33 N.W.2d 30 (1948) ; Murphy v.
Moyle, 17 Utah 113, 53 Pac. 1010 (1898).
3. E.g., Newman v. Burwell, 216 Cal. 608, 15 P.2d 511 (1932). In that case the
court said of its decision:
[I]t is the solemn duty of every father to support his children during their
minority, and if he fails to do so, every principle of justice demands that they
be thus supported out of his estate.
[T]he conclusion we have reached herein may in certain instances destroy the
power of testamentary disposition. It is conceivable that in some cases the
installments of support money accruing after the father's demise may aggre-
gate sufficient to consume his entire estate, thus leaving nothing on which a
testamentary disposition might act .... [A] conclusion contrary to the one
herein announced might well result in certain cases in the minor child be-
coming a public charge. It would seem that the well-being of the child is at
least as important as the father's power of testamentary disposition.
4. In general the arguments in favor of allowing a claim for child support are
stronger than those for alimony. Alimony was unknown at common law although the
obligation to support one's offspring has a recognized common law basis. Even on
grounds of social policy, a divorced wife is not thought to be in such need of main-
tenance as are the minor children of the marriage. See generally 24 Am. Jur. 2d
Divorce and Separation §§ 827-36 (1966) ; Comment, 62 W. Va. L. Rev. 91 (1959)
Comment, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1079 (1949); Comment, 11 Wash. L. Rev. 45 (1936)
Comment, 35 B.U.L. Rev. 596 (1955); Note, 32 Tul. L. Rev. 123 (1957); Annot., 18
A.L.R.2d 1126 (1950), and 39 A.L.R.2d 1406 (1953).
5. Hill v. Matthews, 416 P.2d 144, 145 (N.M. 1966).
6. Id. at 144.
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the parents entered into a child support agreement by stipulation
prior to their divorce and the stipulation was subsequently ratified
by the divorce decree. In the stipulation the father agreed to con-
tribute specified amounts7 to support the couple's daughter until
her majority or emancipation. Upon the father's death, the major-
ity of his estate passed by devise to an older daughter by a former
marriage; the younger daughter who had been receiving child sup-
port payments was bequeathed nothing.' Because of the father's
death, however, the younger daughter became entitled to receive
certain Civil Service and Social Security death benefits.9 This action
was brought in the name of the younger daughter for an award
from the father's estate equal to the present worth of the child sup-
port payments that would accrue until she attained her majority.
Plaintiff prevailed in the district court and on appeal the New
Mexico Supreme Court, held, Affirmed; the assumption of an obli-
gation of child support in a stipulation pursuant to a pending di-
vorce creates an enforceable claim against the estate of the father
if the stipulation is ratified by the subsequent decree. 10 The Social
Security and Civil Service benefits to be paid to the child were not
regarded as support from the estate of the father," although the
present worth of these benefits exceeded the present worth of the
stipulated child support payments that were to accrue in the future. 2
After considering the legislative grant of power to the courts
enabling them to effectuate the child support provisions of a divorce
decree,' the court in Hill decided that it was not bound to follow
the common law rule. The relevant statute provides that the decree
7. The payments were to be fifty dollars per month to age six and seventy-five
dollars per month thereafter.
8. The older daughter was beneficiary of a $5,000 life insurance policy and resi-
duary legatee of her father's estate which was approximately $10,000. His relatives,
divorced wife, and younger daughter were left one dollar each.
9. The sum of these payments exceeded seventy-five dollars per month. They began
at the time of the father's death, when the child was eighteen months old, and would
continue until the child was eighteen years old.
10. The original action was brought in the probate court which recognized the
right to enforce the continuation of payments; but a lump sum equivalent to the present
worth was not awarded. Both parties appealed to the district court from the ruling of
the probate court, and the district court confirmed the obligation and awarded its pres-
ent worth. The supreme court affirmed the district court but remanded for a recalcula-
tion of the present worth of the series of payments.
11. 416 P.2d at 146.
12. The court found that the present worth of the child support payments was
$9,691; an equivalent calculation shows that the present value of the Social Security
and Civil Service benefits is $9,800. Chemical Rubber Company Standard Mathematical
Tables (10th ed. 1955).
13. 416 P.2d at 145.
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may be enforced as a lien on any real property owned by the obli-
gor ;14 the court reasoned that this statute indicates that public
policy in New Mexico favors enforcement of this type of obligation
as one in rem, not as one in personam which would terminate upon
the death of the obligor.
The court in Hill considered the defendant's argument "that by
reason of a divorce decree a child is in a better position in respect
to his father's estate than he would be without the decree for di-
vorce.' 1 5 The result, however, was justified upon the ground that
the preferential position of a child of a divorce is not created by the
divorce decree but by the stipulation between the parents.' The
stipulation was equated to a contract between the parents17 of
which the child would be a third party beneficiary, and his rights
under the contract were compared to those of a general creditor
who may proceed against the estate of his debtor.'8
The purpose of this Comment is to suggest that, considering the
broad terms of the New Mexico statutes governing divorce,'" child
support payments should not necessarily terminate upon the death
of the father except to the extent that such claims interfere with the
rights of general creditors against the father's estate and to the
14. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-7-16 (1953) provides:
In case a sum of money is allowed to the child or children by the decree for
the support, education, or maintenance of such child or children, such decree
shall become a lien on the real estate of the party which must furnish the
child support from the date of filing for record a certified copy of such decree
in the office of the county clerk of each county where any of such property
may be situated.
It should also be noted that N.M. Stat. Ann. §22-7-21 (1953) allows enforcement of
the decree by attachment, garnishment, execution, or contempt proceedings.
15. 416 P.2d at 145.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 22-7-1 to -22 (1953). In particular N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-7-6
(1953) provides:
In any suit for the dissolution of the bonds of matrimony, division of prop-
erty, disposition of the children, or for alimony, the court ...may make and
enforce ... such order to restrain the use or disposition of the property of
either party, or for the control of the children ...during the pendency of
the suit, as in its ...discretion may seem just and proper . . . and, on final
hearing ...may set apart out of the property of the respective parties, such
portion thereof, for the maintenance and education of their minor children,
as may seem just and proper, and may make such an order for the ...main-
tenance and education of said minor children . . . as may seem just and
proper; and may modify and change any order in respect to the ...main-
tenance or education of said children, whenever circumstances render such
change proper. Said district court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all
matters pertaining to said ...maintenance and education of said children.
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extent that such claims are modified by the district court as proposed
by this Comment.
.By its holding in Hill the court rejected the common law view
that regards as invalid a claim for future child support payments
after the father's death; it is not clear whether the court could
properly be categorized as adopting the second or third view men-
tioned above.2 0 The second and the third views agree that the claim
for continuation of the obligation may be allowed. The second view
seems to be only a more restricted application of the third view.
This is because it seeks to find a manifestation of the trial court's
intention that the obligation survive. Although this provides a
theoretical difference between the second and third views, in prac-
tical application this is often a search for intention on an issue that
was not considered. Such a search may easily devolve into a ration-
alization of what the court thinks that public policy should require.
This essentially amounts to an acceptance of the third group of
jurisdictions which holds that the child support obligation is always
enforceable against the obligor's estate.
Furthermore, in deciding to reject the common law rule, the
court in Hill reviewed the statute that allows a child support decree
to become a lien upon the real estate of the father.2 The court con-
cluded only that the public policy of the state would permit contin-
uation of the obligation after the father's death. Courts accepting
the second view, however, enforce the obligation only if they can
find a manifestation of the trial court's intention to continue the
obligation. These courts typically hold that sufficient intention is
manifested if the divorce decree made the obligation a lien on the
father's property. 2 Section 22-7-16 of the New Mexico statutes
provides that the child support obligation may be made a lien upon
the father's real property, regardless of the trial court's expressed
intention, merely by proper recording of the decree. Therefore, it
would seem that under such a statute a further search for intention
is unnecessary and that the second view's "intention" requirement is
satisfied in all cases. This also would justify acceptance of the third
view by the New Mexico court.
The New Mexico court in Hill made one statement about the en-
forcement of child support obligations that seems to have an ambig-
uous implication. It said:
20. See text accompanying notes 2 and 3 supra.
21. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-7-16 (1953).
22. See note 2 sutra.
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The law provides a general creditor with the remedy to proceed
against the estate of his debtor and no good reason presents itself to
our minds why a child should not be able to enforce a judgment for
support. 28
The court failed to elaborate whether the child could enforce its
claim on an equal priority with the estate's creditors or only after
the creditors claims had been satisfied. If equal priority were in-
tended, it would create new problems in the administration of es-
tates. First, unless the assets of the estate were sufficient to satisfy
all debts, including the present worth of the child support payments,
the personal representative would have to delay payment of all
obligations until the enforceability of the child support payments
had been ascertained.24 Second, if the child's claim is allowed equal
priority with other creditors, it permits an opportunity to defraud
creditors. To illustrate, a father heavily encumbered with debt and
anticipating death in the near future, could accept a divorce and
child support obligation. His children would get a share of the
estate's assets despite its overall insolvency. Thus, the obligation
for future payment of child support should only be paid from the
residue of the estate after its creditors have been satisfied.
Child support payments in New Mexico should therefore be an
obligation on the residue of a father's estate, after creditors have
been satisfied and despite a manifestation of the divorce court's in-
tention. However, simply enforcing the obligation without consider-
ing modification of it would be generally unfair. A truly equitable
result will be the exception rather than the rule if the New Mexico
court rejects the common law view, only to allow strict enforcement
of the obligation. The father's death creates significant changes in
the status of the parties. An example will illustrate the potential
inequity that may result from the present New Mexico rule. Sup-
pose the father, a high-rate wage earner with relatively little sav-
ings, is required to make child support payments under a stipulation
ratified by a divorce decree. If he subsequently remarries and has
more children, upon his death, by the reasoning of Hill, his di-
vorced wife might successfully claim the major portion of his per-
sonal estate for the benefit of the child of the first marriage, but to
23. 416 P.2d at 145.
24. In Hill the creditors had been paid and the residue of the estate was not as
great as the present worth of the child support payments. Letter From Lalo Garza,
Attorney for Appellee, to Patrick W. Hurley, July 25, 1966. Consider whether the court
would sustain an action by the child's guardian against the executor for improper dis-
bursement of the assets of the estate.
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the detriment of the children of the second marriage. An equitable
solution to this hypothetical requires enforcement of a modified
child support obligation only after analyzing the needs and means
of all those who were dependent upon the father. Due regard
should be given to any benefits accruing to the dependents subse-
quent to the father's death, including Social Security or Civil Serv-
ice benefits.
The initial question is whether the court would have authority to
modify the terms of a child support obligation after the death of the
father. The courts generally have broad authority to modify the
terms of a divorce decree to either increase or decrease the amount
of child support payments while the father is living. The New
Mexico court's position concerning modification inter vivos was
stated in Quintana v. Quintana.5
In so far as the order reviewed relieves defendent of the payment of
* future installments for child support, the trial court had undoubted
power thus to vacate the prior order, if new facts made such a change
proper. . . . If a change in conditions should occur affecting the
future welfare of the minor children, the trial court has express
statutory jurisdiction to modify or change any previous order in
relation thereto.26
This statutory authority to modify a decree derives from section
22-7-6 of the New Mexico statutes.27 That statute is concerned with
the circumstances of the situation and does not specifically require
the father to be living. Thus, it appears that the executor or admin-
istrator of the deceased father should have the authority to request
such a modification.
Assuming that the court has the authority to modify the decree
after the father's death, is the situation a proper one for exercising
such authority? An answer to this question requires an understand-
25. 45 N.M. 429, 115 P.2d 1011 (1941). In Quintana the father was to support his
daughter who was in the mother's custody. Because of illness, the father was in de-
fault on the payments, and the trial court dismissed a citation for contempt after find-
ing that his illness was a good cause for the failure to pay. The mother subsequently
levied execution on the father's truck, and it was sold with the net sum applied to the
payments in default. When the mother tried again to institute contempt proceedings
after the defaults had continued, the trial court held that the first levy was a full settle-
ment of her demands. The father was relieved of obligation for the defaulted pay-
ments which had already accrued, but the court specified that the settlement ordered
was limited to the duration of the circumstances then found to exist.
26. Id. at 432, 115 P.2d at 1012-13.
27. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-7-6 (1953). Portions of this statute are set forth in note
19 supra.
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ing of the criteria used by a divorce court for setting the amount of
child support payments. The criteria for the initial determination
or for allowing modification thereof have not been enunciated in
New Mexico. The New Mexico Supreme Court has limited itself
to statements that the particular awards being questioned were not
such an abuse of discretion as to require reversing the lower court.28
The generally recognized factors considered by a divorce court in
setting an award for support of minor children are the needs of the
children, considering their station in life, and the ability of their
father to pay.29 However, in evaluating the father's ability to pay
the court may consider not only expenses for himself but also
expenses incurred for others to whom there is a legal or moral
obligation. 80
Since a father's ability to pay child support along with his other
legal and moral obligations is an accepted consideration for modify-
ing a support award, upon his death in an action to enforce the
obligation against his estate there should definitely be a reevalua-
tion of the obligation. The practical reasons for this were recog-
nized over sixty years ago by the New York Court of Appeals. In
Wilson v. Hinman,3' the New York court considered the claim of
a wife to continuation of alimony payments which had been secured
by a mortgage on real property of the husband. The payments were
to continue "so long as she shall live." The court said:
In this country . . . the class of persons whose income is derived
solely from accumulated wealth is comparatively small. The income
of most men is derived from their professional or business exertions,
and the award of alimony is usually based on such an income, not on
one accruing from accumulated property. An allowance of an amount
which it would be entirely just that a man should pay during his
life . . . might be grossly extravagant if imposed as a charge upon
his estate after his death, and very unjust to other claimants on his
property.82
A drastic change in ability to pay occurs when the obligation is
28. E.g., Jones v. Jones, 67 N.M. 415, 356 P.2d 231 (1960). In this case the mother
was contesting numerous aspects of the divorce decree including the adequacy of the
child support award.
29. Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 324 (1965) and cases cited therein.
30. Hardy v. Hardy, 117 Cal. App. 2d 86, 255 P.2d 85 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953) (trial
court was entitled to consider the fact that the father had obligations to support a
child by a former marriage, when the trial court set the amount of child support in
their current divorce action).
31. 182 N.Y. 408, 75 N.E. 236 (1905).
32. 75 N.E. at 238.
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shifted from a working man to his estate. This change is a proper
situation for review and possible modification of the amount of
child support payments. In addition to the change in status of the
obligor, significant changes may have occured in the other major
factor controlling child support payments-the needs of the child.
The child may likely be the recipient of a legacy from the father
which will tend to satisfy his needs. A few of the jurisdictions that
allow claims for continuation of child support against the father's
estate have considered whether a legacy from the father to the
child satisfies the father's obligation.
In Taylor v. George,3 3 the California Supreme Court was called
upon to answer such a question. The father in that case had named
his son, for whom child support was required, as the beneficiary of
his life insurance. The insurance proceeds exceeded the future sup-
port payments that the divorce decree specified, and the naming of
the beneficiary of the insurance policy had been left to the father's
discretion by the decree. In his will the father expressly noted that
no other provision had been made for the son because the proceeds
of the insurance should more than meet his needs. The California
court said:
[T]he decedent's will when reasonably construed shows that the
testator intended to and did fulfill his obligation of support by means
of the life insurance policies. No reason appears why the testator could
not, by his will, designate the fund out of which his obligations were
to be met.34
This holding is compatible with the proposal of this Comment be-
cause it recognizes that the obligation survives; yet the holding
allows the obligation to be satisfied by the testator in his own man-
ner, respecting his testamentary disposition if possible. 5
The needs of the child also may be affected materially by receipt
of the father's death benefits. Those death benefits accruing to a
child from Social Security and Civil Service as in Hill cannot ac-
tually be considered a legacy from the deceased father's estate since
33. 34 Cal. 2d 552, 212 P.2d 505 (1949).
34. 212 P.2d at 508.
35. Contra, Gainsburg v. Garbarsky, 157 Wash. 537, 289 Pac. 1000 (1930), where
the father died owing $2,250 in delinquent payments, and $1,400 of future payments
had not accrued. The child was designated the beneficiary of a $10,000 life insurance
policy on the father and a clause in his will said: "I give . . . to my daughter . . . all
my life insurance that I now have that is payable to her." The insurance proceeds
were not allowed to satisfy the support obligation because the testator's will did not
expressly request the substitute. The court pointed out that the insurance proceeds were
distributed according to the policy, not according to the terms of the will.
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it is generally held that the decedent had no vested property right
in them." However, it should be observed that in cases like Hill
the death benefits alone would have provided what the divorce
decree had required for the child's maintenance." In addition, it
cannot be disregarded that the child will receive the death benefits
as a sole result of the father's endeavors. In this light they are not
greatly dissimilar from a legacy.
On the issue of considering these benefits, the court in Hill said
that neither party had presented any pertinent authority on the
issue; the parties had only argued "whether or not child support
payments terminate upon the death of the father."3 The court
remarked:
It is well that the contention end at that point since the social security
payments and civil service benefits now received by the minor child
.will end as soon as she attains the age of 18 years, whereas the
stipulation and decree of divorce required the payments by the father
to continue until the child reached her majority, or her emancipation,
whichever occurs first.39
It is not apparent that the termination date of the payments should
make them unworthy of consideration. The judgment of the court
required the executor to make a payment equal to-the present worth
of the future child support payments which was comparable to the
present worth of the death benefit payments.4 It is not improbable
that these death benefits appeared to the father to provide with
certainty for his younger daughter's maintenance up to the age of
eighteen years if he died before his obligation to make support pay-
ments ceased.
The course of action advocated by this Comment was applied by
the Supreme Court of Michigan over sixty years ago. In Creyts v.
Creyts41 a support requirement was entered against the father to
continue "until further order of the court." He had five sons and
daughters, children of a former wife, who were all adults; after the
divorce the father had married again. Upon his death the divorced
36. E.g., Kaplan v. Flemming, 190 F. Supp. 526 (D.C.N.Y. 1961) (held that the
beneficiary had no vested property right and that his benefits could be divested by Con-
gress). Roston v. Folsom, 158 F. Supp. 112 (D.C.N.Y. 1957) (held that Social Security
benefits were not property rights to which one could succeed).
37. See note 12 supra.
38. 416 P.2d at 145, 146.
39. Id. at 146.
40. See note 12 supra.
41. 143 Mich. 375, 106 N.W. 1111 (1906).
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wife applied to the courts to continue the support obligation. It
held:
[I]n the interests of justice . . . where the rights of bona fide
holders have not intervened, the court may alter, amend, enlarge, or
diminish the decree, as the necessities of the one and the ability of the
other party may require, and that it may protect the child by mak-
ing the decree a charge upon property to prevent its dissipation, and
that the power is not determined by the death of the husband. 42
In order to preclude the defrauding of general creditors and to
facilitate the administration of estates, all general creditors' claims
should be satisfied first. The needs of all the deceased father's de-
pendents should then be considered, not merely the needs of those
children whose interests were specified by a divorce decree. The
father's earning capacity while he was alive, which was a primary
factor in setting the level of payments, is eliminated; and there is
a likelihood that a legacy, life insurance, or other means of satis-
faction such as Social Security or Civil Service death benefits may
have arisen for some of the children. It is conceivable that in some
cases the court's study may justify an order that the support pay-
ments be increased rather than decreased or terminated. If the
needs of the child have increased and the estate under the burden
of all its obligations is able to pay more, then the rule should allow
this as if the father were still living.
It is only by recognizing the continuation of an obligation for
child support as found in Hill and by recognizing the power of the
courts to modify and adjust support payments on the basis of needs
of the parties that there can be assurance of a result equitable to all
those involved. A desirable solution, however, should interfere no
more than necessary with the deceased father's testamentary plans.
PATRICK W. HURLEY
42. 106 N.W. at 1112.
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